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1 Introduction 
 
The revenue raised for the public purse plays an important role for the functioning of the 
state. Especially, taxes on personal and corporate incomes are the crucial source of 
revenues. (OECD, 2016) Corporate taxes, among other revenues, accounted for about 
8.8 percent of OECD state income on average in 2014, as analysed from Table 3.12. of 
Revenue Statistics 2016 (OECD, 2016). Although most of the countries are dependent 
and levy tax on corporate incomes, they also seek to attract business by offering them 
lower tax rates. These policy strategies have created loopholes for multinational 
corporations (MNCs) to avoid paying taxes.   
 
Following “Luxembourg leaks” (ICIJ, 2014), the tax rulings that were set up by 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) drew international attention. It revealed tax rulings 
between the state of Luxembourg and more than three hundred MNCs that collectively 
sought to reduce their tax payments. While the issue of tax evasion with the application 
of transfer pricing has been a controversial matter, it has not been tackled in depth. 
Tackling the tax issue is not simple as it deals with international tax rules and regulations 
that were originally laid more than hundred years ago. There is therefore a need of 
attention to the international tax rules. 
 
This thesis aims to study the practice of transfer pricing and its association with tax 
evasion. The case studies of Starbucks and Amazon are taken to discuss examples of 
ways in which MNCs evade their taxes through manipulation of transfer pricing.  
 
In response to the growing problem of corporate tax avoidance and the exploitation of 
transfer pricing and more sophisticated tax planning through services provided by PwC 
and similar consulting firms, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) initiated its Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) programme 
in 2013 (OECD 2014). This aims to bring states together as part of a cooperative effort 
to reduce corporate tax avoidance and restore part of the tax base. 
 
Further in this thesis, the BEPS project report is taken into consideration to see how 
implementation of the action plans set will help avoid evasion of taxes. The actions 8-10 
and 13 are examined closely as they are focused on transfer pricing. The major concern 
in this report is for MNCs to take their corporate responsibility in the global economy.  
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2 Literature Review 
2.1 Taxation  
 
Tax revenue can be defined as the revenues gathered from taxes on income and profits, 
social security contributions, taxes on goods and services, payroll taxes, taxes on the 
ownership and transfer of property, and others (OECD Data, 2016). From the Revenue 
Statistics, OECD defined taxes as compulsory unreturned payments as the benefits 
received by the taxpayers are not in proportion with their payments (OECD, 2016).  
 
Total tax revenue as a percentage of GDP shows the part of output which is collected 
through taxes. This indicates the extent of government control on its economy's 
resources (OECD Data, 2016). That is why the tax revenue raised for the state plays an 
important economic role.  
 
2.1.1 Corporate Taxation 
 
There are various sources of tax revenue for a state. It was reported that OECD countries 
are mostly dependent on consumption taxes, such as the value added tax (VAT), and 
social insurance taxes, such as the payroll tax (OECD, cited in Pomerleau, 2015). On 
the other hand, their corporate tax revenue constitutes about 8.8 percent of total tax 
revenue on average in 2014, as analysed from Table 3.12. of the Revenue Statistics 
2016 (OECD, 2016). All OECD countries impose a tax on corporate profits but have 
different definitions of taxable profit and how tax rates are applied. (Pomerleau, 2014) 
As illustrated in Figure 1 below, OECD countries have different corporate taxes rates, 
whose definitions vary according to the state. The difference in how they define corporate 
taxation has resulted in countries that seek to attract business by offering lower tax rates. 
Shaxson (2011) defines these countries as tax havens, as they provide other individuals 
or companies an escape from the duties engaged from living in and gaining benefits from 
society. 
 
Currently, tax havens are causing a controversy and being very common globally. 
Shaxson (2011) claims that over half of world trade and most international lending are 
processed through tax havens. Additionally, the international consortium of investigative 
journalists (ICIJ) reported that Luxembourg has been offering secured secret deals to 
more than 340 multinational companies (MNCs) as shown in the leaked documents. 
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These companies have channelled hundreds of billions of dollars through Luxembourg 
and saved billions of dollars in taxes. (ICIJ, 2014) Companies apply transfer pricing in 
booking their tax saving by creating complicated accounting and legal structures. This is 
done with the help of specialist firms like KPMG, PwC, EY and Deloitte, among others 
(ICIJ, 2014).  
 
 
Figure 1. The Corporate Tax Rates in Selected OECD Countries (OECD, 2016) 
 
As seen from the figure above, the U.S. currently has the highest rate of corporate tax at 
35%. However, in practice there are loopholes and special allowances providing a tax 
break to U.S. companies (Johnston, 2017).  Some of these loopholes are carried interest, 
“rent-a-cow”, accelerated depreciation, loss carry-overs and so on. The carried interest 
is a special tax break used for operators of hedge funds and private equity funds 
(Stewart, 2016). The hedge funds or general partners of private equity are compensated 
for their management services in two ways. The first way is when about one or two 
percent of the total assets managed is received as a management fee. The other is the 
carried interest, in which the general partners are rewarded for around twenty percent of 
profits that have accumulated above a specified ‘hurdle rate’, which is usually about eight 
percent. Although the management fee is taxed with ordinary rate of 35%, the carried 
interest is taxed as a capital gain at a rate of about 20%. (Johnston, 2017) The Florida 
Greenbelt law, which is also known as “rent-a-cow”, was created to preserve farms and 
ranches, allowing special low tax rates. (Weissmann, 2012) This was very successful. 
However, more than 90 percent of people benefiting from this tax break are developers 
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and not farmers or ranchers. They avoid high taxes by temporary raising of cattle or 
planting pine trees, sometimes even in some parts of the land where construction of their 
houses has begun. The owners of 27,000 acres of land would have had to pay 11 million 
USD in property taxes in 2013 without the greenbelt designation. However, with the 
Greenbelt law, they paid only 1.95 million USD. (Wiatrowski and Salinero, 2014) All 
states, whether with low or high corporate tax rates, are faced with tax issues. There are 
tax havens with lower tax rates and at the same time loopholes in countries with higher 
tax rates. This is apparent as loopholes are more necessary in countries with higher tax 
rates. In other words, the official tax rate is not necessarily the real tax rate as people 
presume.  
 
2.1.2 Tax Evasion through Tax Havens 
 
As was recognised in the 1987 Report by the OECD, there were difficulties involved with 
acquiring a clear definition for tax havens. Its 1998 Report sets out various features of 
tax havens. From this report, tax havens are shown to possess features such as no or 
only low taxes, lacking efficient exchange of information, lacking transparency and no 
substantial activity requirement (OECD, 1998). Shaxson (ed. 2016) loosely defined a tax 
haven as a ‘place that seeks to attract business by offering politically stable facilities to 
help people or entities get around the rules, laws and regulations of jurisdictions 
elsewhere’.  
 
Thirty-five secrecy jurisdictions have been identified in the OECD’s blacklists of 2000 
report. However, OECD’s project died as Paul O’Neill, the former President George W. 
Bush’s first Treasury secretary, did not seem to understand the issue of tax havens in 
the beginning (Shaxson, ed. 2016). This was well reviewed by Sullivan (2007) of the Tax 
Justice Network, mentioning that there was no improvement despite the efforts put in by 
OECD to tackle the issues. The U.S., however, came to realise the seriousness of the 
issue from discovering that it lost about seventy billion dollars annually from offshore 
evasion. This is a really huge amount - if only half of it would be collected it could support 
the Medicare prescription drug program without collecting any other means of tax or 
reducing other budgets (Shaxson, ed. 2016). 
 
Two months after the death of the OECD’s tax haven project, there was the attack of al-
Qaeda on 11 September 2001. There was an urgent need for better cooperation and 
transparency concerning financing of terrorists by secrecy jurisdictions by the 
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administration of the former President George W. Bush. This led to the endorsement of 
U.S. administration for ‘on request’ sharing of information. A country will give information 
about their taxpayers on a case-by-case basis if requested, under specific conditions. 
That is to say, the requester has to prove exactly why they need this information. This 
could not be called transparency, however, as it was very conditional.      
 
As clarified by Shaxson (ed. 2016) in Treasure Islands, finding out how much of 
information is exchanged on request globally is difficult. As admitted by Geoff Cook, chief 
executive of Jersey Finance (cited by Shaxson ed. 2016), in the seven years after Jersey 
agreed for exchange of information with the U.S., it only exchanged information on ‘five 
or six’ cases. This is a minuscule amount as the U.S. was estimated to be losing 70 
billion USD every year, which means there must be more than a million-plus U.S. 
offshore accounts. In addition to this, there was a huge problem because receiving 
information after the request has been made would take several months or years. The 
situation got worse after the economic crisis of 2007, as the OECD eliminated the tax 
havens from the blacklists if countries signed twelve agreements to share information 
with other countries (Gravelle, 2015). Another issue for the exchange of information is 
that the countries themselves do not have sufficient information of the value. For 
instance, the British Virgin Islands where there are more than 400,000 registered 
corporations, the laws do not require identification of shareholders or directors and 
financial records. Signing of agreements to share information does not help as it is 
unclear what kind of information can be exchanged.   
2.2 Transfer Pricing 
 
Transfer pricing refers to the application of profits for tax and other purposes between 
parts of a multinational corporate group (OECD Observer, 2008). This is important for 
both the corporate group and the government as it determines the corporate tax paid.  
   
The example featured in the OECD Observer report well illustrates this phenomenon. 
Consider a profitable company (the parent) that buys micro-chips from its own subsidiary 
in a country with a higher tax rate. The price the company pays to its subsidiary is the 
transfer price. This will determine how much profit the subsidiary reports and how much 
local tax it pays. When the parent sets the transfer price lower than its normal local 
market price, the subsidiary appears to have incurred losses while the parents record 
profits. Additionally, as the subsidiary is located in a country with a higher corporate tax 
rate, the company as a whole pays less tax and is more profitable (OECD Observer, 
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2008) In this case, the companies are manipulating the transfer pricing as the companies 
are trying to escape from the duties that come with operating and benefiting from society 
in its operations. 
 
On the contrary a MNC could suffer double taxation on the same profit without the proper 
application of transfer pricing. Considering the example above, the tax administrator in 
the location of the parent company is happy with much profit to tax whilst the tax 
administrator of counterpart subsidiary is unhappy as they do not have much profit to 
tax. The tax authority of the subsidiary’s location then would want to record the profit 
when it finds out that the transfer price of a micro-chip was set at a lower price than the 
normal market price. But this poses a problem for the parent company as it is already 
paying tax on its overall profit as shown in its account. Since the company operates as 
a group, it is liable for tax in all the countries of its operation and in dealing with two or 
more different tax authorities it cannot simply reject others against the one or pay many 
times (OECD Observer, 2008) For such reasons, the complexity around volatile 
application of transfer pricing has to be considered when designing and implementing 
the transfer pricing. Such measures will help both corporates and governments with 
securing as well as maximising their profits and tax revenues, respectively.  
 
2.2.1 OECD Transfer Pricing Guideline 
 
The OECD provided an extension to Article 9 of the OECD Model which is a first report 
purely on transfer pricing matters, which comprises the arm’s length principle (Lohse, 
Riedel and Spengel, n.d.) This served as a basis for Transfer Pricing Guidelines for 
MNCs in 1995 and has been continually revised since. 
 
The MNCs are at the centre of the global economy. These guidelines are needed as 
governments must ensure that taxable profits of MNCs are not shifted out of their 
jurisdictions but are taxed accordingly. Additionally, taxpayers need to guard themselves 
from double taxation resulting from a dispute between two countries on the determination 
of the transfer pricing for their cross-border transactions. The Transfer Pricing Guidelines 
for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations provide guidance on the 
application of the “arm’s length principle” for the valuation, for tax purposes, of cross-
border transactions between associated enterprises. (OECD, 2010) However, it was 
conservatively estimated by the OECD that there are about 100 billion USD to 240 billion 
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USD, approximately 4 to 10 percent of tax revenue lost from global corporate income 
because MNCs shift their profits to exploit arbitrage opportunities (APPG, 2016).  
 
2.3 Base Erosion Profit Shifting (BEPS) Project 
 
With the “Luxembourg leaks” scandal (ICIJ, 2014), it was revealed that more than three 
hundred multinational companies (MNCs) have been evading taxes with current rules, 
which includes the “arm’s length principle”. This incident has made it evident that the 
current rules are weak and this has led to OECD and G20 countries working together to 
tackle international tax issues. The base erosion profit shifting (BEPS) project aims to 
restore confidence in the system of international tax rules and to ensure that profits are 
taxed where economic activities take place and value is created (OECD, 2015).  
 
There are positive views towards the move of the OECD and G20 as they have 
succeeded in engaging 39 countries to sign up bilaterally to automatic exchange of 
country-by-country reports. However, there are more concerns over its effective 
implementation as it is difficult to examine its implementation progress. Additionally, as 
the OECD could not achieve public country-by-country reporting for this. Although there 
is opportunity for the government tax authorities to access the country-by-country data, 
the data may not be reliable due to lack of transparency as it is not made open to the 
public. Another major concern is about the non-participation of key countries like the U.S. 
and secret jurisdictions such as the British Virgin Islands. (APPG, 2016) 
 
The BEPS Action plan, which was agreed by the G20 finance ministers, identified 15 key 
areas to be tackled.  The actions are laid out to provide governments with solutions to 
handle the international tax rules which permits shifting of profits (APPG, 2016). 
 
2.3.1 Action 8, 9 and 10  
 
“The stated objective of BEPS Actions 8, 9 and 10 is to come up with transfer pricing 
rules which are in line with value creation in particular rules to prevent BEPS by 
transferring risks or moving intangibles among, or allocating excessive capital to, group 
members, and by engaging in transactions which would not, or would only very rarely, 
occur between third parties”, as summarised in EY Tax Insights (van Herksen 2016). 
The newly introduced concept is aiming at accurately delineating the controlled 
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transactions through identification of economically relevant characteristics or 
comparability factors to test. That is, checking is required if the transaction between 
associated entities is realistic when compared to other independent entities in such 
transactions. (van Herksen, 2016) A new six-step process is also introduced for 
analysis of risk assumed in a controlled transaction. In this process are: the 
identification of economically significant risks with specificity, the determination of 
contractual assumption of the specific risk, the functional analysis in relation to risk, the 
interpretation of steps 1 to 3, the allocation of risk and pricing the transaction, and 
taking into account the consequences of risk allocation. (Ashurst, 2015 & van Herksen, 
2016)  
 
There is new guidance on the transfer or use of intangibles to verify that the group 
members are compensated accordingly with the economic activity that produced the 
profits, that is value creation through performance functions, use of assets and risks 
assumed, enhancement, maintenance, protection and exploitation of intangibles (van 
Herksen, 2016). It includes goodwill and going concern value but does not include 
group synergies and market-specific characteristics (Ashurst, 2015) This new guidance 
is expected to be implemented in the domestic laws of many countries including G20/ 
OECD member countries (van Herksen, 2016).  
 
2.3.2 Action 13  
 
There are two main goals in the Action 13. The first is to increase transparency in terms 
of tax affairs of MNCs by asking them to provide tax authorities with all the information 
related to global allocation of incomes, taxes and its location of economic activities in 
different tax jurisdictions with the help of country-by-country template. The second is to 
simplify transfer pricing documentation regulatory burdens for taxpayers, that is the 
administrative cost of regulations, and to make the documentation more valuable for tax 
authorities. (van den Brekel, 2016) Action 13 on transfer pricing documentation and 
country-by-country reporting is in direct contact with Actions 8, 9 and 10 (van den Brekel, 
2016). The tax authorities could use a country-by-country template as a risk assessment 
tool. This could serve as an audit roadmap to detect any inappropriate tax planning.   
 
Country-by-country templates raised many concerns, but the matter was finally decided 
to be kept confidential from the public and only open to the tax authority in the country of 
their ultimate parent company. This will enhance security for exchanging of information 
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with countries with which the companies want to have their confidentiality. About 12 
countries introduced legislation to implement the new transfer pricing documentation and 
country-by-country requirements in 2015. In 2017, KPMG updated a summary of country 
implementation as shown in the figures below. 
 
 
Figure.2 Country-by-country Reporting: Country implementation summary (KPMG, 2017) 
 
From the figure above, it is noticed that there are 54 countries that have implemented 
country-by-country reporting, 7 countries with draft bills and 15 countries with the 
intention of implementation. At the same time, for master file and local file 
implementation, there are 25 countries which implemented, 5 countries with draft bills 
and 21 countries with intentions of implementation (see Figure 3 below). 
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Figure.3 Master File/ Local File: Country implementation summary (KPMG, 2017) 
 
As shown above, there are many countries that have either already implemented, with 
draft bills, or with intentions to implement the Action 13. However, it was observed that 
there are variations in the way countries are implementing for things such as timing, 
materiality thresholds and definition of terms. These might result in uncertainty in the 
reporting (van den Brekel, 2016). 
 
2.3.3 Other concerns toward BEPS 
 
There are negative opinions, as the implementations of BEPS add up to a global tax 
system which is already complicated on its own (APPG, 2016), it was mentioned by the 
All-Party Parliamentary Group (APPG) in the United Kingdom (UK) that this new set of 
rules could rather provide even more opportunities for the players such as accountancy 
firms, banks, lawyers and advisers. There are concerns that this will only improve the 
situation in the short term, rather than in long term. This is because the OECD 
concentrated on counteracting the international tax system’s immediate harmful 
consequences rather than reconstructing the principles of the international tax system. 
A close examination of the principles is required as the international tax system for 
corporate tax that was created nearly a century ago is no longer relevant. Additionally, 
globalisation of business and other transformations have been made due to digitalisation. 
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This makes it more complicated for determining the exact location for value creation to 
decide which country should obtain its tax revenue.  
 
The developing countries, due to their lack of capacity, might find it difficult to ask for and 
use the relevant data they need in order to secure their tax revenues from MNCs. There 
are therefore concerns about the capacity and capability of developing countries in the 
implementation. It is recommended that the resulting data should be made public, as it 
would be crucial for developing countries to have access to data. Public transparency 
does not only benefit developing countries but it is also the best way to restore people’s 
trust in the international tax system. 
 
2.4 The U.S. Tax System 
 
From the study of corporate inversions, the reasons behind the behaviours of many 
American originating MNCs can be understood to some extent. The American approach 
to corporate taxation differs from that of other countries. Whereas other countries tax 
only the corporate income of domestic corporations, the U.S. government taxes an 
American corporation no matter where it is situated for its operation. American 
corporations that are therefore operating abroad are liable for 35 percent of income 
earned abroad and are credited for the foreign taxes paid to other governments. (Chiu, 
2015) Although it has the high corporate tax rate compared to other OECD countries, its 
corporate tax revenues as a share of GDP are only the OECD’s average. For example 
as reported by Brookings, corporate profits were 12 percent of GDP but corporate tax 
revenues collected were around 2 percent of GDP (Krupkin and Gale, 2016).  
 
As has been documented, U.S. corporations are globally notorious for their tax avoiding 
behaviours (Clausing, 2016). Due to the U.S. system of taxation, many U.S. corporations 
have shifted their income-deriving operations outside of the U.S. and into low-corporate 
tax jurisdictions. This can be seen in the recent trend for corporate inversions, which is 
referred to as the action of American corporations legally moving to a foreign jurisdiction 
to be free from their corporate tax burdens within the U.S. (Chiu, 2015). The “inversion” 
can take place via three different paths: the substantial business presence, a merger 
with a larger foreign company, and a merger with a smaller foreign company. In the 
substantial business activity, a U.S. corporation forms a subsidiary abroad. The U.S. 
corporation and foreign subsidiary exchange stocks usually in proportion to the 
respective company valuations. It does not require any change in the control of the 
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corporation and so is known as a ‘naked inversion’. After the exchange of stock, the new 
subsidiary is a foreign corporation with a U.S. subsidiary. (Marples and Gravelle, 2017) 
The second way in which a U.S. corporation can re-incorporate abroad is by making a 
foreign company buy the U.S. corporation. Then the foreign company owns the company 
and the old U.S. corporation disappears. However, it still takes its daily operations but 
domiciled in a new country. (Investopedia, n.d.) The final path in which a U.S. corporation 
can be incorporated is a merger with a smaller foreign corporation. However, the majority 
of the shares of the new merged company is owned by the U.S. shareholders. (Marples 
and Gravelle, 2017) As cited by Chiu (2015), there were over 12 corporations in 2014 
alone that proposed inversions, completed the inversion process, or are in the process 
of inversion with varying success. The well-known brand names of inverting corporations 
in 2014 are Pfizer, Chiquita Brands International, Medtronic and Burger King. Although 
new regulations have prevented several proposed inversions, there will still be 
continuous attempts by these MNCs to free themselves from tax burdens.  
 
The merger of two pharmaceutical companies AbbVie, which was a Chicago Illinois-
based and Shire, a Channel Islands-based Company brought about formation a 
subsidiary in the Channel Island of Jersey, “New AbbVie”. It then became a U.K. resident 
for tax avoiding purposes. (Gelles and Scott, 2014) AbbVie expected the merger to result 
in about a 13 percent of reduction of its effective tax rate by 2016. The United States 
Department of the Treasury announced guidelines that purportedly would reduce the tax 
benefits of American corporations from performing the same re-domiciling merger. Only 
a few months later AbbVie ended its merger plans with Shire and AbbVie will have to 
pay 1.635 billion USD as a break-up fee. (Gelles, 2014) Burger King, on the other hand, 
was successful in its acquisition of Tim Hortons although it was accompanied by scrutiny 
from the U.S. government. Usually, the primarily reason for mergers are due to tax 
benefits. However, the Burger King-Tim Hortons merger has other benefits apart from 
the tax benefits. Firstly, the headquarters of Tim Hortons has to be located in Canada as 
most if its operations and sales are done in that country. Secondly, Burger King plans to 
expand globally not only as a fast food chain but as a coffee chain in line with Wendy’s, 
McDonald’s and Dunkin’ Donuts. (Trevir, n.d.)    
 
It was mentioned above that U.S. has loopholes and special allowances to provide tax 
breaks through carried interest, rent-a-cow, accelerated depreciation, loss carry-overs 
and so on. (Stewart, 2016) The U.S. tax system encourages a lot of behaviour that is 
destructive to the financial health of its federal government, and to the economy at large. 
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High corporate tax rates encourage use of debt finance and discourage selling of 
appreciated assets and repatriation of foreign subsidiary profits (Merrill, 2007). The U.S. 
companies on the other hand, do not pay taxes on debt-financed investments, amounting 
to what can be classified as a subsidy (Clausing, 2016). For instance, there are tax 
allowances given to corporations that accumulate debt. These can be manipulated so 
that a company like Apple, officially the world’s richest company, borrows billions of USD 
by selling bonds so that it can reduce its tax liability. This is done by using rules that were 
designed (at least officially) to help start-up companies. The same tricks are used by 
private equity firms (Platt 2016). 
 
In the U.S., the federal and state business and tax laws support corporations with flexible 
legal forms of organisation. That is, a business does not have to be organised as regular 
corporations under two levels of tax which are the corporation and the shareholder levels 
but it can operate as corporations, partnerships, or limited liability companies that are 
not under the entity-level tax. (Merrill, 2007)  
 
The former President Obama wanted to prevent U.S. corporations from taking 
inversions, if at least 50 percent of the shares are owned by the U.S. parent’s corporation. 
His administration called on Congress to make inversions difficult for companies. 
(TaxFairness, 2014)  Democrats and Republicans both agreed that a short-term solution 
was required. However, they did not come to agree about how anti-inversion legislation 
should be like. (Shear and Gelles, 2014) On April 4 2016, the Treasury Department took 
action to limit “corporate inversions”. The former President Obama was delighted about 
the action as he has been supportive about the closing of inversions loophole for years. 
Additionally, he has immediately called Congress to close the inversions loophole for 
good. (Zients and Hanlon, 2016) The Obama administration put in effort to stop 
corporations from fleeing the country to low-tax countries, shifting taxable income out of 
the U.S. However, the President Trump asked for a review of the 2016 tax regulations of 
Obama, hoping to overturn the anti-inversion rules. Republicans and businesses are 
happy that the Trump administration is having a second look at the 2016 tax regulations. 
(Lawler, 2017) This originates from his tax plan that “the lower rate makes corporate 
inversions unnecessary by making American’s tax rate one of the best in the world” in 
2015. (Schroeder, 2015) He recently announced his proposal of cutting the corporate tax 
rate from 35 to 20 percent, and to shift the tax base from a worldwide to a territorial 
system. (Cnossen, Lejour and Riet, 2017)  
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The Fiscal Times (2017), CNBC (2017) and Forbes (2017) mentioned that the tax reform 
framework released by the Trump administration and congressional Republicans 
appears to have several problems. The main problem is associated with the budget 
deficit and level of federal government debt. It was concluded by Yahoo Finance’s Rick 
Newman that “the biggest break Trump wants to kill – the deduction for state and local 
taxes”. Without killing this, the revenue has to be raised elsewhere. (Rainey and 
Rosenberg, 2017)  Additionally, this reform creates a tax bill which adds to the deficit. 
Senator Bob Corker of Tennessee is against the cutting of taxes as he believes that it 
will be the greatest threat to the U.S. The tax reform is forecasted through analysis to 
add 1.4 trillion USD to 1.6 trillion to the deficit over the first decade and maybe much 
more. Despite all these, the Trump administration claims that economic growth from 
passage of the bill can compensate the lower corporate tax rates and tax cuts which 
benefit the rich. (Werner, 2017) The position of U.S. tax policies is critical at this point as 
it determines the behaviour of corporations.   
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3 Cases 
3.1 Starbucks 
 
From the case of Starbucks, the following ways in which giant MNCs escaped the 
corporate tax were discovered. The case of Starbucks was on the surface and was 
known to the public.  
 
Starbucks is a Seattle-based group with a market capitalisation of 40 billion USD and is 
the second-largest café chain globally. However, Starbucks paid only 8.6 million pounds 
in corporate tax for 14 years of its operation in the U.K. and nothing was paid in the three 
years up to 2011 (Geoghegan, 2012). It had U.K. sales of nearly 400 million pounds in 
2011 but paid no corporate tax at all (Peston, 2012). This was appalling as the number 
one ranking McDonald’s paid over 80 million pounds on 3.6 billion pounds sales in U.K. 
and Kentucky Fried Chicken, the number 3 global restaurant or café chain paid 36 million 
pounds on 1.1 billion pounds of sales in U.K. (Bergin, 2012) It filed losses of several 
millions of pounds yet informed its investors that the business was successful. 
Additionally, Starbucks mentioned that it was taking the successful lessons learnt in U.K. 
to apply to the company’s largest market and also promoted the former head of the U.K. 
and Europe, to head the U.S. Business. 
 
Unfortunately, there was no concrete evidence that Starbucks had broken any laws. 
Additionally, they defended themselves by saying that the company strictly follows 
international accounting rules and pays the appropriate level of tax in all the countries of 
its operation. However, their contradicting reports were disclosed through close study of 
its group’s financial statements and the transcripts of 46 conference calls with investors 
and analysts. (Bergin, 2012) There were the issues hiding behind the record of no profit.  
 
From the in-depth investigations launched in June 2014, the European Commission 
concluded on 21 October 2015 that the Netherlands has granted selective tax 
advantages to Starbucks’ coffee roasting company. The tax ruling issued by the 
Netherlands tax authority artificially lowered the tax paid by the company. (European 
Commission, 2015) One of the ways they used was through royalties on Intellectual 
properties. These companies shield billions from tax authorities by housing intellectual 
property units in tax havens, and then charging their subsidiaries substantial royalties for 
using it.  
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From the investigation of the commission, it was observed that Starbucks, after 
consulting the Dutch tax authorities, installed its European headquarters in the 
Netherlands and started a huge coffee roasting plant in Amsterdam. Starbucks created 
several Dutch partnerships which were not subject to the corporate tax, including one 
which was named Emerald City. Emerald city owned Alki, which was set up in London 
to own Starbucks’ intellectual properties including logos and the recipe for roasting coffee 
beans. That is how Starbucks Manufacturing and subsidiaries paid very high royalties to 
Alki. Alki, thanks to its structure, was not subject to corporate tax, neither in the 
Netherlands nor Britain. (Alderman, 2015) The Commission claimed that this payment is 
not justified as it does not adequately reflect market value. (European Commission, 
2015). The recipe was mainly temperature for roasting of beans (Alderman, 2015). The 
Commission (2015) said no other Starbucks companies or roasting operation paid 
royalties for the same information.     
  
Another method of averting tax responsibility was through allocation of funds generated 
in the U.K. to other subsidiaries in its supply chain. Starbucks purchases coffee beans 
for the U.K. through a Lausanne, Switzerland-based firm, Starbucks Coffee Co. 
However, these beans were roasted at a subsidiary based in the Netherlands before 
being transported to the U.K. (Bergin, 2012) In such context, there would have been a 
need of setting prices with the use of “transfer pricing”. It was however understood that 
the tracking of the transactions in these companies is difficult, even if it was clear that 
Starbucks implemented transfer pricing in order to evade of taxes. 
 
As Reuters (2012) reported, it was not clear how Starbucks had allocated such costs. 
What was clear was that Starbucks shifted its funds to Switzerland. While its U.K. 
subsidiary made a loss, the Netherlands roasting operation had a small profit, which is 
about 1.6 million EUR from an average annual turnover of 154 million EUR. The profit 
was only about 1 percent of its turnover, meaning that more than 84 percent of the 
roasting operation is used for buying the raw coffee beans, the electricity for roasting 
them, the packaging and transport. Yet, Starbucks declined to give details on the charges 
its roaster paid to its Swiss unit for coffee beans. It also declined to disclose information 
about the profit the Swiss coffee-buying unit makes as Swiss law does not require the 
unit to publish the accounts. However, it was important to note that corporate tax rates 
tied to international trade in commodities like coffee are as low as 5 percent in 
Switzerland. From further investigation by the Commission (2015), it was revealed that 
Starbucks Manufacturing’s tax base was unduly reduced as it pays high prices to a Swiss 
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company for green coffee beans. The margin on the beans has more than tripled since 
2011 (European Commission, 2015).  
 
Apart from the two methods mentioned by the Commission, Reuters (2012) suggested 
the third way in which MNCs cut their tax liability is through inter-company loans. U.K. 
tax authorities are aware of this and are trying to limit the technique as it is a well-known 
way for shifting profits to low-tax jurisdictions. Such loans have a double tax benefit to 
multinationals as the borrower can set any interest paid against taxable income, and the 
creditor can be based in a place that doesn’t tax interest. It was determined that 
Starbuck’s U.K. unit is entirely funded by debt, and paid group companies 2 million 
pounds in interest in 2011 (Bergin, 2012).  
 
Starbucks shifted its European corporate headquarters to the U.K. in 2014 (Bowers, 
2015). It has also shuttered its U.K. company named Alki that was part of escape network 
designed to cut taxes (Davies, 2015). It announced that the London headquarters paid 
15 million USD in U.K. corporation tax in the 15 months to September (Houlder, 2016). 
However, the tax accountant Richard Murphy mentioned that the accounts for Starbuck’s 
European parent company, Starbucks EMEA, have to be published before we can find 
out if Starbucks is still aggressively avoids tax or not. This is because they declare a 
profit and are appearing to be paying taxes on it but the public still do not know if it is the 
right profit and what royalties it is paying to its related companies. (Davies, 2015).  
 
These kinds of problems arise as most of the big MNCs’ group earning statements do 
not break down their profits and tax payments by country (Bergin, 2012).  As mentioned 
by Bowers (2015) in the Guardian, the investigations of the commission under the 
European state aid regulations do not have power to tackle tax avoidance directly. They 
can only intervene to conclude that it is harming the competition with the proof of what 
the players were doing in tax avoidance. As seen earlier with the statement of Murphy, 
it is difficult to know what royalties are being paid and how tax havens are used and if 
they are paying fair taxes on fairly stated profits.   
 
3.2 Amazon  
 
Following the Luxleaks in 2014, Amazon’s case came to the surface. The case of 
Amazon raised more issues concerning how huge multinational corporations continue to 
avoid tax payment. As Richard Murphy (2014) of the Tax Justice Network mentioned, it 
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is time consuming to prove tax avoidance and these cases are particularly so. Although 
there is enough awareness raised concerning tax avoidance of multinational 
corporations, it is difficult to prove this because the schemes implemented are very 
complex.   
 
Amazon.com or simply Amazon is a Seattle, Washington-based company which is the 
largest Internet-based retailer in the world (Jopson, 2011). It was first launched in the 
U.K. in 1998 and won an award for its best service in 2012. As Britain’s biggest online 
retailer, it generated more than 3.3 billion pounds sales in 2011. However, due to its 
transfer of ownership from U.K. to Luxembourg in 2006, its sales which were more than 
7.6 billion pounds were not subject to any corporate tax for the following 3 years. Amazon 
therefore paid no tax on its billions of pounds sales. Amazon stated that its U.K. business 
is only a delivering organisation and is owned by Amazon E.U. When Amazon was asked 
for the reason why it did not pay corporate tax to U.K., it refused to answer but re-directed 
its answer explaining that it has complex operation which serves tens of millions of 
customers all over Europe in 27 countries only with hundreds of employees in 
Luxembourg. (Griffiths, 2012) The key issue that needs to be addressed is, what is sold 
here and what is sold ‘into’ here, as mentioned by Murphy (cited in Griffiths, 2012). In 
other words, the arrangement regarding the distance sellers who sell things in the U.K. 
is required to be clarified for tax matters.    
  
The tax planning scheme of Amazon began in 2000 and came into function in 2006 to 
save billions by setting up operations in Luxembourg. This scheme was finally revealed 
to the public from a landmark court case in Seattle between Amazon and the U.S. Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS). (Marks, 2016b) This case could force Amazon to pay more than 
1.5 billion USD (Marks, 2016a). It was realised that Project Goldcrest is a highly complex 
28-step scheme, which took more than two years to complete (Davies, 2016). It was also 
revealed that Amazon employed an economist who worked in the global financial 
advisory company Deloitte to invent ways in which its tax burdens may be reduced 
(Marks, 2016a). At this instant, until there is a final decision on the IRS case, Amazon is 
safe. Jack Blum, a leading defence attorney in the U.S. specialised in money laundering 
mentioned that it features “so many layers of complexity that no auditor for a national tax 
service can possibly penetrate it” (cited in Marks, 2016a). 
 
Project Goldcrest started its investigation from series of complex intercompany contracts 
which transferred intangible assets such as vital software, trademarks and other 
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intellectual properties to Amazon Europe Holding Technologies (AEHT) based in 
Luxembourg. So, it is AEHT which holds the rights to use Amazon’s intellectual property. 
AEHT then licences it to Amazon EU Sarl (AEU) in Luxembourg, which operates 
Amazon’s businesses in Europe. AEU pays hundreds of millions of euros for using the 
IP in a form of royalties every year, helping it to reduce the amount of taxable income 
within the company. Although large profit is made in AEHT, it is not taxable as the 
partnership between AEU and AEHT are considered not taxable in Luxembourg. Finally, 
AEHT pays Amazon’s U.S. Company for managing the European licensing rights (Davis, 
2016). Amazon experiences benefit from Luxembourg ownership in the battle for 
lucrative and fast-growing e-book market as they will impose 3 percent VAT rather than 
20 percent VAT imposed on British-based e-book retailers (Griffiths, 2012) 
 
  
Figure. 4 Amazon’s tax structure (Guardian graphic, 2016) 
 
The case of tax avoidance through Project Goldcrest raises tension between the U.S. 
and Europe concerning how multinationals should be taxed when they operate in both 
jurisdictions. Both governments were deprived of its huge sum of taxes revenue and it is 
necessary to collect back the taxes which were not paid on Amazon’s multibillion dollars 
of income in Luxembourg. From the tax structure implemented by Amazon, US tax 
inspectors consider that intercompany payments from Amazon in Luxembourg, AEHT to 
its US Company have been too low. However, at the same time, European investigators 
believe that Amazon has inflated royalties from one of its Luxembourg entities to AEHT 
which are paid for using IP’s. There was political sensitivity in Europe as the technology 
giants minimised their tax bills by shifting intellectual properties, which are difficult to 
value, into offshore havens and charge subsidiaries large royalties in return for using 
them.  (Davis, 2016) 
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Following are the deductions from the ongoing case between Amazon and the IRS. The 
IRS claimed that Amazon’s motives were clear from the outset about Goldcrest Project 
which they used to avoid U.S. corporate income taxes. Tax inspectors additionally 
claimed that they quantified costs and benefits only for the purpose of avoiding US 
income taxes. Amazon on the opposite side stated that their profits were used for 
investments and that the nature of their industry made it low margin. (Davis, 2016) They 
claimed to have invested over 20 billion EUR in Europe since 2010 and that they are 
expecting to hire 15,000 people in 2017, resulting in 65,000 people hired in Europe 
(Sweney, 2017). The IRS doubted the legality of methods which were implemented by 
Amazon in making up complex intercompany contracts to transfer intangible assets to 
Luxembourg. As mentioned earlier, the complicated nature of its scheme makes it 
difficult for the auditors to penetrate into its working mechanism (Marks, 2016a).  
 
In 2016, Amazon paid 15 million pounds in tax on European revenues of 19.5 billion 
pounds reported through Luxembourg. These figures bring concerns about Amazon 
using complex cross-border arrangements to avoid taxes. Not only this, but its U.K. 
services which operate the company’s warehouse and logistics operation declared 
corporate tax bill which was more than half the amount from 15.8 million pounds to 7.4 
million pounds in 2016. There was this reduction despite its increase in the turnover from 
946 million pounds to 1.46 billion pounds. (Sweney, 2017) 
 
Amazon keeps on claiming that they are contributing to the society by creating job 
opportunities and that they are investing in Europe. However, will creating more jobs and 
investing make them responsible as a corporation? As Ana Arendar, Oxfam’s head of 
inequality mentioned, there is urgent need of country-by-country reporting for 
multinationals to make sure that they pay their fair share of taxes (Sweney, 2017). 
Proving one’s act of avoiding taxes thus ensuring transparency of tax data is critical as 
many critics are suggesting with the implementation of country-by-country reports. 
Additionally, the problem does not only lie on the multinationals like Amazon but it is due 
to the politicians and technocrats who created such a complicated tax code. People who 
are able to afford it find loopholes and exemptions in this complicated tax code and take 
advantage of them (This is Money, 2015) Simplification of the tax code to help easier 
implementation and to make it fairer is another urgent need for all countries all over the 
world.  
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3.3 Additional Problems Associated with Transfer Pricing 
 
Apart from the ways in which MNCs escape tax responsibilities, the growth of the tax 
advisory sector should also be considered carefully as it is these specialists that play the 
major role in helping corporates with evading taxes. The profitability of these firms further 
attracts other accounting firms to join the row of tax evasion. The ICIJ reported that the 
leaked documents of Luxembourg involved deals negotiated by 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), one of the world’s largest accounting firms, on behalf 
of hundreds of corporate clients. To qualify the companies for tax relief, the records 
show, PwC tax advisers helped the companies to come up with financial strategies that 
feature loans among sister companies and other moves designed to shift profits from 
one part of a corporation to another to reduce or eliminate taxable income. (ICIJ, 2014)  
 
EU finance ministers took an important step towards ending banking secrecy in Europe 
by agreeing legislation that would require all 29 member countries to disclose assets 
held by foreign EU nationals in their financial institutions (Spiegel, 2014). Surprisingly, 
Luxembourg is also ending banking secrecy, which had been one of the “cornerstones” 
of its national policy. Luxembourg dropped its long resistance to EU transparency rules 
and said it would allow European depositors’ data to be sent back to their home 
countries. Yet, it fought back against accusations that it helped leading multinationals 
avoid billions of USD of tax. (Oliver and Spiegel, 2014) The implementation will start in 
2017 and this still leaves Austria alone. Additionally the EU hailed the agreement as a 
major step in the fight against tax evasion and made Switzerland agree to start sharing 
financial information with the European Union as reported by CNN (Kottasova, 2015)  
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4 Conclusion 
Tax evasion is a result of different corporate tax rates implemented by various countries 
according to their own policy. Difference in tax rates and complication in tax codes has 
created loopholes to escape taxes by multinational companies (MNCs). Not only with the 
application of transfer pricing, however, there are numerous ways adapted by 
Multinational companies to evade taxes. This has become evident through the leakage 
of documents in Luxembourg in 2014, which were also discussed in this thesis. As 
mentioned earlier, tackling the tax issues is complicated as it deals with international tax 
rules and regulations. Additionally, fast changing global environment has made it even 
more complicated, as companies apply digitalisation.   
 
The effort of OECD and G20 countries were successful to engage 39 countries to sign 
up bilaterally automatic exchange of country-by-country report. However, the progress 
was not evident as studied in this thesis. It still could not achieve public country-by-
country report which lacks transparency. Additionally, implementation of BEPS makes 
the tax rules more complicated and could provide loophole opportunities for the evaders. 
From the study, it was evident that close examination of existing rulings and research 
into the fast-growing global environment are required to amend guidelines for long-term 
international use.  
 
It was seen from the case studies that the profit breakdown statements for all countries 
that the company is operating is necessary to avoid problems. It is crucial that OECD 
and G20 work to aim at filling country-by-country statement for profit. Many MNCs have 
wrong point of view for its corporate responsibilities as deduced from Amazon’s claim. It 
has to be made clear to all MNCs that contributing to the society by creating job 
opportunities and investing have no relation with its responsibility for taxes. 
 
From my opinion, the European Commission requires more power to tackle tax issues 
directly as they are currently only intervening to stop activities that are harmful to 
competition with in European Union. Empowerment will help control the misbehaviours 
of MNCs in EU. Additionally, making tax rulings for the tax advisory sector is urgent as 
these consulting firms are growing fast due to its profitability. Problem of tax issues 
cannot be solved by a few countries alone as it is very complicated. There is a need to 
raise more issues and concerns publicly, raising awareness of people such that these 
problems would be tackled comprehensively.  
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